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on what the Justices said, or should have said, to one another.
Kalven rarely ventures into the broader litigation process, let alone
"social" analysis. 6
To be fair, Kalven himself recognized that, by plunging into
the Court's own first amendment opinions and waging his war of
position, he ran the risk of missing other battles. One of his marginal notes concedes that his intensive effort to reconnoiter the field of
Court opinions left him with a ''philosophic map" of free speech
that ignored at least "three facts: the sheer weight of broadcasting,
the sheer weight of advertising, and the ownership of the means of
communication." It is this larger project-to understand, and to
confront in appropriate political ways the economic, social, and cultural dimensions of communication in the twentieth century-that
Harry Kalven, Jr., has left to others. 7 If A Worthy Tradition lacks
the comprehensive "map" that he himself had hoped to leave behind, this is still a text that should both provoke and inspire. Students of the first amendment owe a great debt to Professor
Kalven-and to the two people, Jaime Kalven and Owen Fiss, who
translated his manuscript into his book.

ELITES AND THE IDEA OF EQUALITY. By Sidney
Verba, 1 Steven Kelman,2 Gary R. Orren,J Ichiro Miyake, Joji
Watanuki, lkuo Kabashima and G. Donald Ferree, Jr.4 Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. $30.00.
Steven H. Balch s
Elites and the Idea of Equality reports the results of an inquiry
into the views that "elites" in the United States, Sweden, and Japan
hold about the various permutations of the idea of equality. The
elites examined represent a variety of domains, including leaders in
politics, business, labor, bureaucracy, media, and the intellectual
world. The leaders of several insurgent groups consisting of feminist, minority, and youth organizations are also surveyed.
6. See, e.g., Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Theory. 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1205 (1983); R. POI.ENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS (1987).
7. See, e.g., Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 (1986).
I. Professor of Government, Harvard University.
2. Associate Professor of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University.
3. Department of Public Policy. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University.
4. Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut, Storrs.
5. Associate Professor of Government, City University of Ne\1. York.
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Some of the findings are interesting. We learn, for example,
that virtually all the groups studied underrated-in comparison to
the estimate of others-the degree of political influence they possessed, tending to view themselves as beleaguered by their rivals'
assaults. Most of the findings, however, are quite predictable. For
example: Americans' individualism allows them to accept greater
amounts of economic inequality than the Swedes, while the sense of
group solidarity displayed by the Japanese bestows special responsibility on private groups, such as the corporation and the family, for
maintaining welfare functions assumed by the state in the West.
Their data, the authors argue at some length, reveals that conflicts over political equality are more intense and likely to be harder
to resolve than those involving economic disparities. One reason
for this, they claim, is that the measures of political standing are far
less exact than those of relative income, so that conflicts over how
to divide the pie are exacerbated further by disagreements over who
already has a big piece. More important, economic differences have
come to be more or less accepted as inevitable consequences of the
need to maintain productivity incentives. Political equality, in contrast, is almost universally regarded as a matter of absolute right,
serving as a validation of personal dignity and full citizenship.
Most of the book's discussion of political equality centers on
voting and access to centers of government power. Though some
questions pertaining to "gender" equality are addressed as well, issues of legal equality and protection from public and private discrimination-what in the United States have come to be known as
the realm of "civil rights"-are largely ignored. Yet as far as the
United States is concerned, it is here that the authors' insight about
the especially delicate quality of status conflicts is most pertinent.
And this is particularly true with respect to the politics of constitutional interpretation.
One of the most significant developments in the evolution of
American political culture has been the transformation of the concept of private property from something enshrined within the edifice of natural rights theory to something defined and limited by
positive law and considerations of social utility. Two hundred years
ago, and for a long time thereafter, attempts to interfere with the
use of private property or the right to contract were often regarded
not only as wrongheaded disruptions of natural economic forces but
also as violations of the rights of man. Consequently, the courts
were less hesitant to overrule economic regulations. Today, of
course, such matters are considered to be the virtually unchallenged
monopoly of politicians, an allocation of power that has obvious
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substantive overtones. On the other hand, questions of political and
civil equality are increasingly pulled into the orbit of the judiciary.
If Verba and his colleagues err, it is in thinking that the preference given to political rights over those conventionally thought of as
purely economic reflects some sort of eternal truth. American history reveals that this primacy is rather recent and the result of social changes of types that a time-bound study of this nature is
unlikely to detect. Moreover, within the American political system
this shift of attitudes is of the utmost significance: so long as property questions are seen as matters more profane than sacred, we can
confidently expect that, for better or worse, many constitutional
scholars will continue to favor narrow interpretations of the property clauses of the Constitution.

CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH. By Sanford Levinson.t
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 243.
$19.95.
Herbert Hovenkamp2

This well written, intelligent volume takes up a subject that is
too big for its two hundred forty-three pages, but takes it up well
nonetheless. Professor Sanford Levinson seeks to discover the religious content of the Constitution. Not the religion clauses of the
first amendment, but the civil religion of the Constitution as a
whole. In what ways is belief in the Constitution like religious belief? Specifically, in what ways are the various doctrines of constitutional interpretation like the doctrines of religious, or scriptural,
interpretation? How is the constitutional oath like the pledge of
service that the religious believer might offer to his religious organization or his god? When does dissent or unlawful behavior amount
to an admission that one is not "committed" to the Constitution, or
to American constitutional government? Does the law school
teacher of the Constitution have true academic freedom, liberally
defined? Or do we have some overriding obligation of basic fidelity
to the constitutional enterprise? These are big questions, and Professor Levinson provides some perspectives, though not an answer,
for each of them.
Levinson notes that, ever since the Constitution was written,
its supporters have used religious language and imagery to defend it
I.
2.

Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas.
Professor of Law. University of Iowa.

